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I have very little argument with the basic framework which Professor
McKean presents.' Indeed, if one allows for the limitations on the
detail possible in a paper, the framework in many respects closely
parallels parts of the framework which I have been using independ-
ently and which is partially set out in an article in the Journal of
Law and Contemporary Problems2 and more fully in a recent book.3
The problems I have are more with the conclusions toward which
Professor McKean tends. I say tends because at many points he makes
clear that different goals would justify different results, and that, even
accepting the goal of economic efficiency, one can "logically" defend
systems of liability different from those which he seems to prefer. Yet
once he has said this it seems quite clear that he believes that, to the
extent economic efficiency is the goal, a system of consumer liability
is likely to be best, except where producer fault or something which
he feels is close to it can be shown.
t Professor of Law, Yale University.
1 A.B. 1965, Duke University; LL.B. 1969, Yale University.
1 This paper was jointly written by Kenneth Bass and Guido Calabresi. Because there
are citations to other writings of Calabresi and because it would seem awkward to refer
to those in the third person, we have preferred to use the first person singular in this
paper.
Our comments were written as a critique of the paper Professor McKean delivered at
a conference sponsored by the Joint AEA-AALS (American Economic Association and
Association of American Law Schools) Committee in March, 1969. McKean has since up-
dated his paper and while he has not explicitly revised it to meet the criticisms there
made, some changes in emphasis inevitably occurred. As a result, we feel that some of
our criticisms were perhaps more appropriate to the original version than they are to
the current version. Rather than revise our paper, however, we have preferred to leave
it essentially in its original form and apologize to Professor McKean if some of the crit-
icisms seem stronger than is justified.
2 Calabresi, Does the Fault System Optimally Control Primary Accident Costs?, 33 LAw
& Co mrmp. PaoB. 429 (1968). This article, which was not available to McKean when he
originally wrote his paper, criticizes the fault system as a method of controlling primary
accident costs.
a G. CALABREsi, THE COSrS OF Accma'ENs: A LEAL AND ECONoMIc ANALYSIS (1970). This
book was not available when McKean's paper was being prepared.
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This inclination I believe to be totally unwarranted by the goal of
economic efficiency. Its general defense is made possible only (1) by
an analysis which is insufficiently detailed in considering what trans-
action costs in practice are likely to make consumers or producers
what I call the cheapest accident cost avoiders (McKean would say
those who have a comparative advantage in preventing accidents4)
and (2) by treating all products liability situations as if they were
essentially the same, while in reality they differ precisely in factors
which affect the relative ease with which a consumer or producer can
avoid accident costs.
Most of my critique will be devoted to this point. I shall not, how-
ever, talk specifically about the disadvantages of using fault as a stan-
dard, as I would merely be repeating much of what I said in the
article in the Journal of Law and Contemporary Problems. Before I
take it further, however, I would like to make one general comment
about McKean's framework.
Professor McKean writes as if we had two goals: economic efficiency
(which is fairly traditional resource allocation) and fairness or equity
(which encompasses all else). There is nothing logically wrong with
using such a framework. But it does have certain practical disadvan-
tages which are seen best by considering how McKean treats the issues
of accident cost spreading and of the deep pocket (what I call the
problem of secondary accident costs). To McKean these are entirely
questions of what income distribution we want and simply an aspect
of fairness or equity.5 In fact, most of the problems of secondary ac-
cident costs are due as much to the rapid changes in wealth which
would result from unspread accident losses, as to the general degree
of income disparity which exists in a society. As a result, many of the
solutions (like negative income taxes) designed for income disparity
would do very little to alleviate the economic and social dislocations
which flow from unspread accident costs. This in itself would argue for
treating them separately from more general income distribution prob-
lems.
More important, however, even though diminution of these second-
ary accident costs almost invariably entails some interpersonal com-
parisons of utility and hence is not amenable to the kind of economic
efficiency analysis which McKean uses, it involves a discussion of
alternatives which are far more concrete than those we usually relegate
4 It should actually be "comparative advantage in reducing accident costs." McKean
does not explicitly discuss the difference, but he clearly recognizes that the concern of
economic efficiency is to minimize the sum of accident losses and accident avoidance costs.
5 See, e.g., McKean text preceding notes 102-03.
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to the catch-all of justice or fairness. Not as economists perhaps, but
as lawyers, we today say with as much assurance as lawyers ever need
that economic and social dislocations resulting from an accident are
lessened if accident costs are spread widely or, to some extent, if they
are borne by the wealthy. And when we say this we may be speaking
of fairly objective items such as the degree of rehabilitation which
occurs if losses are spread as against the cost of not having rehabilita-
tion, as well as of more subjective items like the degree of loss one
man feels at losing $10,000 as against the degree of loss 10,000 men
would feel from losing $1.00 each.
Thus secondary accident cost avoidance is to some extent an alter-
native to economic efficiency (what I elsewhere call the general or
market deterrence method of primary cost avoidance). We do indeed
trade off, as McKean suggests, some economic efficiency for spreading8
and vice versa; but we do this because in a peculiar way we believe
we are comparing costs and not, as McKean says, because we are will-
ing to give up some "fairness" for economic efficiency. Indeed, most
linguistic philosophers would object to the very use of the word fair-
ness in a trade-off situation, seeing it as a minimum test all legal
decisions must pass in the end rather than a subject of negotiation. I
need not go into the uses to which the words fairness or justice can
properly be put. It is enough for this critique to suggest that if we
treat the secondary social and economic costs of accidents together
with more general concepts of what is just, we make it much harder
to analyze the main sources of secondary accident costs, and to discuss
what can be done to lessen such costs most consistently with optimal
resource allocation. In other words, we are likely to make those trade-
offs we cannot avoid more costly than they need to be.
My main problem with McKean's paper does not, however, come
from these questions. It stems from the incomplete picture I feel he
gives of how we should go about allocating accident costs even assum-
ing economic efficiency to be our goal.7 Like McKean, I start from the
6 McKean text accompanying note 3.
7 The bulk of this critique, therefore, ignores those situations where for a variety of
reasons we prefer to make collective rather than market decisions as to how many acci-
dent costs as against accident avoidance costs we want. Discussion of this collective choice
(which I call specific deterrence) and its relationship to the market choices we will make
is an essential ingredient of any complete analysis of products liability situations. And
it is not satisfactory to treat the occasions when we make collective determinations as
justice or fairness trade-offs of the economic efficiency goal, as McKean seems to. Again,
logically one could, but again, analytically one ought not. The reasons for collective in-
terventions are often much more specific than what we usually term justice requirements.
Indeed, they often are based on a judgment that we can accomplish more efficiently by
collective fiat what the market would seek to accomplish but only in a more costly way.
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premise that were it not for transaction costs it would not matter from
the standpoint of economic efficiency who bears the cost of any acci-
dent. While the premise is not new, it is crucial and deserves constant
attention. It is the existence of transaction costs which makes it im-
perative that initial liability be placed on the party or combination of
parties that can avoid accident costs most cheaply.
The existence of large transaction costs is obvious in products lia-
bility situations where "third parties" are injured. The cost of gather-
ing all pedestrians who might be injured by an "unsafe car" or an
"unsafe driver" and getting them to agree to bribe the car makers to
make safer cars or drivers to drive more carefully is both obvious and
enormous. The importance of burdening the party who can avoid ac-
cidents most cheaply when the choice is between an injured third
party on the one hand and drivers or car makers on the other thus
needs no demonstration.
It is not at first glance equally obvious that it is important to make
a correct choice where the injury is to the buyer or seller in a products
liability situation." What are the transaction costs here? Why will not
buyers-if made to bear the burden-impose lower prices on sellers
of unsafe products? Conversely, why will not sellers-if made to bear
the burden-impose higher prices on unsafe users? Unlike many who
have written in this area, McKean recognizes that transaction costs are,
in fact, very significant even in these so-called bargaining cases. It is
worthwhile analyzing these costs in more detail than he does, however,
since such an analysis will help us understand which party in any spe-
cific bargaining situation is likely to be the cheapest avoider of accident
costs.
The transaction costs which attach to a bargaining situation, and
hence to most products liability cases, are generally those of differen-
tiation and risk awareness. If liability is placed on auto manufacturers,
we encourage (make cheaper) all those decisions which involve com-
paring the cost of making safer cars with the accident costs which might
be avoided by having the safer cars. Conversely, we make more expen-
sive all those decisions which involve a comparison of the cost of alter-
See Calabresi, supra note 2, at 455, 458 & n.44. For these reasons, a complete analysis would
treat collective or specific deterrence as a separate head from both justice and market de-
terrence, just as it would treat secondary costs as a separate head. Only after analyzing
each of them separately would it attempt to combine them to reach policy conclusions.
See generally C.ALARS, supra note 3.
8 I say buyer or seller because while the buyer is normally the initially injured party
in a product liability situation, a liability rule that makes sellers strictly liable in effect
makes the seller the injured party. I wish to emphasize that it is the liability rule we
choose and not fate which determines who in the first instance bears the financial burden
of the accident. See note 10 infra.
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ing driver behavior with the accident costs such changes in behavior
would avoid. The reverse is true if we burden drivers. In theory, the
car maker could, if held liable, charge different prices to drivers ac-
cording to their accident proneness. But the cost of distinguishing driv-
ers by accident proneness and enforcing differential prices is likely to
be great enough so that car makers will find this an unsatisfactory way
of lessening the burden; they are more likely instead to concentrate
on making safer cars. Conversely, in theory also, drivers burdened with
accident costs could demand lower prices from makers of relatively
unsafe cars. But here too the information costs are likely to be too
great to lead to much market pressure for safer cars, and the main
thrust of the imposition of losses on drivers will be, if anywhere, on
driver behavior.9
I do not mean to suggest that no pressure will exist on car makers
if drivers are burdened, or on drivers if car makers are held liable. The
most significant sub-categories of each activity might still be reached
despite the transaction costs. For example, if car makers were liable,
it might be worthwhile to sell cars at a different price to families with
teen-age sons. And with driver liability, really unsafe cars might not
be bought except at a discount. But this does not change the fact that
transaction costs make it impossible to make all the distinctions we
would in theory want to make. In other words, they make it essential
that we put the burden on the party or parties which if burdened will
be able to make the most important distinctions and choices, that is,
the party with the greatest comparative advantage in safety. They also
make it likely that we will supplement the market with collective
regulations to control driver behavior if we burden the car makers,
and car making if we burden drivers, but more on that later.
Up to this point then, I essentially agree with Professor McKean.
It is when he starts discussing who is likely to have the comparative
advantage in safety that we disagree. We part company because his
suggestions as to the advantages of fault liability, customer liability
without fault and absolute manufacturer liability suffer both from the
overgeneralization and the insufficient analysis for which he criticizes
9 To demonstrate more clearly how different liability rules can give rise to costs which
hinder efficient allocation, it is helpful to consider two specific examples. If manufacturers
were held liable and they found that the most efficient way to reduce accident costs was
to charge different prices to different consumers, they would face costs imposed by the
Robinson-Patman Act. To prove the price differentials were not discriminatory and ille-
gal, manufacturers would need to conduct extensive market research, keep detailed rec-
ords and defend themselves in court. On the other hand, if consumers bore the initial
risk of accident losses they would face substantial information costs in evaluating the
comparative safety of different products. Similar information costs would also confront
a manufacturer who sought to persuade consumers that his product was a safer substitute.
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the previous writers in the field.'0 On the one hand, he takes a view
from the mountain top and talks as if all product liability situations
were the same in terms of the comparative advantage of users and
sellers in producing safety. On the other hand, he becomes immersed
in the trees and talks as if the party on whom the law initially puts the
burden of an accident is the party who will ultimately bear the burden
and hence will be the party who will make the decisions for or against
a safer but potentially more expensive alternative. The usual case, ei-
ther with or without insurance, is quite different.
I will discuss the second error first and in doing so will set out very
briefly the guidelines1 for finding the party with a comparative advan-
tage in safety. I will then use these to indicate how very different vari-
ous products liability situations are from one another.
The search for the cheapest cost avoider begins with a rough guess
as to the relative ease with which all the parties can avoid any given
category of accidents, that is, minimize the sum of accident losses and
accident avoidance costs. While traditional tort concepts restrict any
such inquiry to the few parties most intimately involved in the acci-
dent, rough guesses should be made on an initial consideration of all
possible parties. It is possible that the state has the cheapest opportu-
nity to minimize automobile accident costs by building better roads
and that allocation of costs to drivers or manufacturers, rather than
to highway departments, results in less than cheapest cost avoidance.
Rough guesses should thus operate primarily to exclude from further
consideration those parties who seem to have minimal opportunity
to reduce accident costs cheaply, but the exclusion process should be-
gin with a constellation of possible loss bearers far larger than the
few parties most closely connected with the accident.
The next step is a refinement of the rough guess. Crucial to this
refinement is awareness of the possible externalization of the burden
from the parties initially held liable to parties who have already been
excluded on the basis of our rough guesses. For example, it is possible
to conclude at the rough guess level that drivers and pedestrians both
have a comparative advantage in minimizing the costs of driver-pedes-
10 I use the terms "liability" and "held liable" as in previous articles.
I am using the term to identify the party who under the law bears the initial
undivided loss, whether that party is the party who is originally injured or the
party who through a legal judgment must compensate the injured party and
thereby becomes the financially injured party. I use the term this way to empha-
size the fact that whether the originally injured party or some other party is
made to bear the undivided loss, in the first instance, is the result of a legal judg-
ment, a "holding liable," and not of metaphysics.
Calabresi, Fault, Accidents and the Wonderful World of Blum and Kalven, 75 YALE L.J.
216, 227 n.23 (1965).
11 These guidelines are described in full in CALARmESI, supra note 3, at 135-73.
1970][
HeinOnline -- 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 79 1970-1971
The University of Chicago Law Review
trian accidents compared to the society as a whole. It would be better
to put the costs of such accidents on either of these parties or some
combination rather than to have the general public bear the expense
through public or private social insurance. Refining the analysis, it is
possible that as between drivers and pedestrians the individual walker
has a considerable comparative advantage. Thus, if we could make him
pay a price equivalent to the cost to society of his failing to look, it
might be far cheaper for him to "look both ways" than it would be if
drivers bore the burden of accident costs and were thus induced to
install pedestrian-finding radar in cars. If, however, we are content at
this point to place liability on pedestrians, we might make a serious
mistake as a result of externalization.
Were we to adopt a liability system which placed the costs of driver-
pedestrian accidents on pedestrians, the matter would not end there.
Pedestrians would seek to obtain insurance and the insurance industry
might find it very expensive to develop categories of walkers which
were based on their accident proneness. As a result they might offer
only one policy of comprehensive pedestrian accident insurance. Worse
still, because walking is not an organized activity, insurance protection
might be economically feasible only as part of a general "all accident"
policy. This would effectively make the cost of car-pedestrian accidents
a general cost of living rather than of walking. And putting car-pedes-
trian accident costs on living generally would mean placing the costs
on an activity that has a far smaller comparative advantage in safety
than does driving.
Nor might externalization be avoided by forbidding insurance by
pedestrians.' 2 If pedestrians who are not insured consistently under-
value the risk involved in failing to look both ways, a very inadequate
pressure to reduce accident costs might result-indeed, a less adequate
pressure than if insured drivers were held liable.'3
12 I am not here concerned with the secondary accident costs and fairness effects of
barring insurance, though they are significant.
13 It might at first glance appear that when the party who bears the loss is not aware
of the risk, the safety incentive is eliminated, not just externalized to another party with
a relative disadvantage in reducing accident costs. In fact, putting the loss on a party who
is unaware does result in a kind of externalization. If we conclude that pedestrians have
a comparative advantage, we must be saying that pedestrians can most cheaply alter their
behavior before the accident in order to reduce the costs of that accident. The party with
the advantage is "pedestrians who before the accident can change walking habits." They
can best choose between the costs of altering their behavior and the cost of bearing the
accident losses. But if in practice the burden of automobile-pedestrian accidents is borne
by pedestrians who before the accident were unaware of the risk, then the actual loss-
bearing category is "pedestrians who are hit and had no incentive to alter behavior be-
fore the accident." Under my assumption that accident burdens on actual victims do not
affect other potential victims, this is as properly termed an externalization as is what
occurs when the ultimate loss-bearing party is society at large rather than pedestrians.
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In effect the decision that pedestrians had the comparative advantage
in safety over drivers was based on the assumption that the cost of not
looking both ways could efficiently be put on the pedestrian at the time
he chose whether or not to look. If, however, that is impossible-if,
indeed, the appropriate cost can be put effectively only on a much
broader activity, like walking in general or just living-the driver
might have the true comparative advantage in safety. This is not be-
cause the individual auto driver will bear the burden. He, after all,
may also insure. But after insurance the category of driver which bears
the loss might have a comparative advantage in safety over the category
which will actually bear the loss if the pedestrian is burdened.
Externalization of costs from the party initially held liable to one
which does not have a comparative advantage in safety can occur in
many ways. I discuss them elsewhere and need not do so here.14 Ex-
ternalization, to give a few examples, may be caused by strictly eco-
nomic factors, like the cost of making up various insurance categories;
or it may result from political judgments or secondary cost avoidance
notions, like a political climate that forbids letting victims be crushed
by accidents, and requires their compensation from the national cof-
fers; or it may occur from psychological factors, like the inability of
potential victims to view themselves lying dead on a slab, in contrast
to the keen ability to foresee oneself injuring another person and be-
ing held financially liable for it. However externalization may occur, the
probability that accident costs will not rest on the parties initially held
liable but will, instead, be externalized to broader categories requires
us to make the search for the cheapest cost avoider at all levels where
the costs may actually be borne, and not, as the fault system does, at
the level of the individual parties involved in the accident. This Mc-
Kean fails to do in any systematic fashion in his analysis of products
liability, and it is this failure that leads him to seem more sympathetic
to fault liability than he should be.
A third step in the analysis is reached if we are unable to make a
sound decision as to who is the cheapest cost avoider even taking into
account the different externalization dangers of alternative allocations
of liability. In this case we should allocate accident losses to the best
briber, that is, that party who is in the best position to find the cheap-
est cost avoider and pay him to adopt the optimal mix of avoidance
and accident costs. In essence we look for the party who can enter into
transactions most cheaply. This assumes that it costs different parties
different amounts to enter into transactions, a very likely assumption,
In both cases the group on whom cost incentives are placed is a different one from that
initially found to have a comparative safety advantage and is one which clearly does not
have such an advantage.
14 See CALApmrs, supra note 3, at 144-50.
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and therefore that we maximize our chance of affecting the cheapest
cost avoider, given that we cannot identify him collectively, if we
charge the party who can find him most cheaply.
For example, in the case of a given consumer product, if we are un-
able to determine whether the manufacturer, the consumer or some
third party is able to reduce accident costs most cheaply, we may none-
theless be able to decide that the manufacturer, say, is in a better posi-
tion than the other parties to find out who is the cheapest cost avoider
and if necessary to bribe the cost avoider to alter his conduct. If that is
so, we can place initial liability on the manufacturer and expect that the
end result will come closer to the theoretically optimal allocation than
if initial liability were placed on some party with higher transaction
costs.
One can go on and develop these themes at great length. Specifically,
one can point out how both quantitative and qualitative allocation of
accident costs to different parties can in many instances lead to cheaper
cost avoidance than would the all or nothing allocations of accident
costs which occur today and which Professor McKean's analysis seems
to accept as inevitable. After all, one party may have a comparative
advantage in avoiding one kind of accident cost but not another. And
one kind of accident cost, for example, pain and suffering, may be
much less easily externalized or undervalued by potential victims than
other kinds. Indeed, arguments can be made that if we know neither
who has the comparative advantage in safety nor who is the best briber
we do better to divide the costs among all the parties involved than to
allocate all of them to one party. But such refinements are not my ob-
ject here. They are necessary to making policy proposals. They are
not needed to point out why the policy suggestions McKean may seem
to give are not warranted, nor why different products liability situa-
tions may justify quite different liability results.
Professor McKean at one point seems to conclude that under manu-
facturer liability without fault "total costs would increase, because ac-
cident prevention would not be produced by those having a compar-
ative advantage in doing so."' 5 He also decided, apparently without
much empirical investigation, that "[m]ost automobile mishaps involve
either driver negligence or plain bad luck rather than defective prod-
ucts .... ,"16 and more importantly that it is, in practice, cheaper to
15 McKean text following note 117.
36 McKean text preceding note 119. McKean may at this point in his article be taking
a view of "defect" that characterized many early decisions applying strict liability-that
is, a view that a product is defective if it fails to conform to its own usual standards or
those of other products used for similar purposes. "Defective" here means something like
the contract term for breach of the warranty of merchantability.
As McKean recognizes elsewhere in his article, the law has progressed well beyond this
[Vol. 38:74
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use market pressures to eliminate negligence than to redesign cars for
greater safety. He apparently has also made the same conclusion about
all other areas of products liability. It is unlikely that McKean is right
if his is meant to be an overall view of automobile accidents, and
certain that he is incorrect in assigning the conclusion to all product-
accident situations.
The fallacy of focusing on products liability as an entirety rather
than on each individual product is shown by a limited examination
of three accident situations involved in many products liability cases-
the transfusion hepatitis, the cosmetics allergy, and the drug allergic
reaction cases. Superficially these examples appear to have many com-
mon features. They all involve relatively low incidence of personal
physical injury or illness. They all involve purchases by economically
weak consumers of products prepared for mass distribution. And they
all involve the bodily use of the product with occasional harm. But
here the similarities end.
From the number of reported cases we have learned a good deal
about the serum hepatitis cases. Courts and juries are agreed that trans-
fusion hepatitis is a statistically predictable event. The disease is con-
tracted when a person is given a blood transfusion containing the hep-
atitis virus which is undetectable by any known method while it is in
the transfusion blood. Blood banks, hospitals and other agencies which
prepare blood know that a certain number of transfusions will result
in hepatitis, but they are unable to detect or prevent the contraction
of the disease. 17 There seems to be no particular class or group of pa-
tients which is especially susceptible. If the virus is in a certain transfu-
sion unit it is almost certain that the recipient will contract hepatitis.
restrictive definition of "defect." There are numerous cases in which a manufacturer has
been held liable for damages resulting from product-related injuries without any show-
ig of defects in the manufacturing process or failure to conform to normal working stan-
dards or industry expectations. Such defects have come to be called "design defects" but
defects they are and liability there is. A trenching machine manufacturer was held liable
partly as a result of one witness' testimony that there was a better way to design the
machine, although there was extensive testimony that the machine produced was very
safe and in no way defective. Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 93 111. App. 2d 334, 352-59, 236
N.E.2d 125, 135-38 (1968). Indeed the landmark case often pointed to as a turning point
in imposing strict liability itself recognized that liability for design defects was completely
consistent with the principles there applied. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59
Cal. 2d 57, 64, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
17 Medical change may be as rapid as legal change and may have overtaken us. An
economical test, costing perhaps as little as twenty-five cents per pint of blood, which
will allow detection of the virus, has apparently been developed. Testing seems to be ef-
fective in 25-50% of the cases. It is almost always correct when it indicates the virus is
present, but gives a "false negative" in a substantial number of cases. See Panel of the
Committee on Plasma and Plasma Substitutes of the Division of Medical Sciences, Na-
tional Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, Editorial, 10 TwmsusioN 1
(1970). See also Washington Star, July 29, 1970, at A9.
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The virus is present in the blood when it is taken from the donor and
does not develop spontaneously in the unit after preparation.
On the basis of these known facts we can begin to look for the party
with the comparative advantage in reducing accident costs. Initially we
shall focus, as have the cases, on the choice between the patient who
contracts the disease and the hospital or doctor who administers the
transfusion.
First, if we are satisfied that the detection of the virus prior to trans-
fusion is inherently impossible and that there will never be any way to
prevent transfusion hepatitis, we are probably justified in concluding
that liability rules have no importance for resource allocation. The
only concern we are left with is justice and secondary cost avoidance
and many argue on either count that it would be wrong to leave the
loss on the hapless patient. If we feel that way, we might decide to
compensate all such unfortunate souls out of general revenue funds.
If, as is more likely, we conclude that there is a possibility that some-
day a method of detection or prevention is possible, then we are justi-
fied in trying to assign initial liability so as to give added incentive to
such research.
Assuming then that the resource allocation effects of our decision
are to be considered, what happens if the patient is held liable? It
would appear that he has one of two choices-to use the blood offered
and take the risk of hepatitis or refuse all transfusions. Prior to his
need for blood, he is unable to adjust his behavior to reduce the risk
of injury except by complete avoidance of the injury-producing situa-
tion. Of course he could make the capital investment in a research cen-
ter for the discovery of a way of preventing hepatitis or alternatively
contribute to the local research facility, but we rightly sense that such
decisions are far less efficient than those that might be made by the hos-
pital itself.'8 It is quite unlikely that the potential patient has the com-
parative advantage at this point.
18 Part of the problem here is that of freeloaders.
The freeloader is the person who refuses to be inoculated against smallpox be-
cause the risk of smallpox to him, given the fact that almost everyone else is in-
oculated, is less than the risk of harm from the inoculation; if enough people are
freeloaders it becomes necessary to compel inoculation to avoid smallpox epi-
demics. He is also the person who refuses to join a union, because the fact that
most other workers are union members assures him of the benefits of unioniza-
tion without the cost. The use of compulsion in these areas suggests that the
problem of freeloaders is crucial whenever many people must agree to bear a cost
in order to bring about a change favorable to all of them. The problem would
not be crucial if nonpayers could be excluded from the benefits of the change,
but such exclusion is often extremely expensive. It is precisely that expense which
justifies compulsion.
Calabresi, supra note 2, at 437 n.13. Cf. Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation
and Liability Rules, 11 J. LAW & EcoN. 67 (1968).
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But this does not mean that the hospital is the optimal loss bearer.
On the contrary it may be the case that the supplier of the blood (the
blood bank) or the original donor is in a far better position to avoid
supplying contaminated blood. Which of these parties is the cheapest
cost avoider depends on the facts of the situation.
Between supplier and donor it would depend in part on whether
the supplier could discover, relatively cheaply, whether the blood was
pure. Even if, in theory, the donor could discover contamination more
cheaply than the supplier, the supplier might be a better loss bearer
because individual donors might not in practice adequately react to
the risk of being held liable because they were judgment proof, insuffi-
ciently aware of the risk, or covered by universal liability insurance
which did not distinguish in price between those insureds who were
prone to be hepatitis-contaminated donors and those who were not.
Externalization of costs if donors were held liable might therefore
make the supplier or hospital a cheaper cost avoider in practice.
Between a general supplier and a hospital the question of compara-
tive advantage would more likely turn on purely technical facts than
on externalization dangers.19 If it were impossible or very expensive to
prevent hepatitis once the blood was prepared, the supplier would ap-
pear to have a comparative advantage. If, on the other hand, the cheap-
est means of avoidance consisted of some simultaneous injection of
chemicals into the blood recipient, then the hospital might be the
cheapest cost avoider.
If we did not know what the best method might be, then we might
want to place the costs of transfusion hepatitis on some national re-
search center which we guess will have the best chance of finding ei-
ther some cure or the cheapest avoider to bribe. This could be done
directly by "assigning" liability say to the Yale University Medical
School,2 0 or indirectly by having the Government pick up the costs
and seek a solution through grants financed by the National Institutes
19 This conclusion depends on an assumption that both suppliers and hospitals are
equally likely to self-insure or at least purchase insurance which adequately reflects their
individual hepatitis-producing potential. Professor McKean impliedly assumes that if
consumers were held liable, safety incentives would be maintained either by self-insurance
or by insurance plans specifically tailored to each individual's accident potential. He fur-
ther argues that manufacturer's liability insurance is likely to consist of broad form
coverage which lumps all producers in one bag. In fact, just the opposite seems likely.
Business insurance tends to be either self-insurance or specially tailored plans, while indi-
vidual accident insurance tends to reflect uniform clauses covering large categories of
persons. See text at pages 88-89 infra.
20 It is not easy, under the existing legal framework, to find a way of directly assigning
liability to a research center that is not connected with the hospital that gave the transfu.
sion. Where the party to whom we wish to give an incentive is not directly involved in
the accident, we are accustomed to using indirect means like variable taxes or subsidies.
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of Health. There are some disadvantages to each allocation, but what
seems clear is that the last person whom we would want to see bear the
costs is the individual patient who is unlucky enough to get the bad
blood.
The situation of allergic reactions to cosmetics is as frequently lit-
gated, often with the same results as in the transfusion hepatitis cases.
Patients are usually held liable on a theory of not burdening health
care. Women whose hair has fallen out are often required to bear the
loss on theories of "allergic reaction" or "idiosyncratic sensitivity." In
this case, unlike the situation in transfusion hepatitis, the end result
may be desirable on resource allocation grounds.
The cosmetic reaction cases can conveniently be divided into two
types-those in which injury occurs to almost every user due to normal
body reactions against certain chemical compounds, and those in which
the normal body does not react but certain particularly susceptible in-
dividuals do. The first class is perhaps economically identical to the
transfusion hepatitis cases while the second class serves as a convenient
contrast.
In most cases of cosmetic allergic reactions it is possible to detect
the sensitivity before using the product. This could often be accom-
plished by using test patches similar to the tuberculin patches used
to detect tuberculosis. In other cases the allergic reaction appears
slowly with continued use, initially as a redness which becomes more
irritated with further use. In either event the individual is in a posi-
tion to detect the risk by some means before serious harm occurs.
Because of the innumerable number of allergenic compounds which
may be present in any given cosmetic combination, the manufacturer
may not be in any position to predict even the aggregate number of
allergic responses, much less the probability that any given individual
will suffer. In such a situation it would appear that the user does pos-
sess a comparative advantage in avoiding the accident, at least once
the manufacturer is held responsible for warning users of possible
allergic reactions. Who has a comparative advantage in providing for
a patch test might, however, be a separate question, the answer to
which depends in part on how likely it is that allergic users will know
that they may be the odd person who is allergic. (In contrast the manu-
facturer knows both more and less, for as to him the occurrence of
the allergy may be a statistical certainty; but he has no inkling of
whom it will hit.) It will also depend on how expensive it is for in-
dividuals to get a patch test if the manufacturer does not supply the
patch, and how expensive it is to provide a patch for every user as
against testing only those who suspect they may be allergic.
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Drug allergic reaction cases are somewhere in between the other
two. Unlike the hepatitis victim, the woman who is likely to suffer a
thrombosis from using birth control pills is an idiosyncratic individual.
But unlike the cosmetic cases there is no cheap way of having her test
herself for the idiosyncrasy. The damage, moreover, is likely to occur
all at once so that there is little chance for the potential victim to
become especially aware of the risk as she begins using the drug. Never-
theless, the individual may have more knowledge than the drug com-
pany that birth control pills are somewhat more of a risk for her than
for others. She may, for example, have a history of thrombophlebitis
or other blood disorder. The comparative advantage in these cases
would depend on whether the likelihood that some could individual-
ize their high risk potential was great enough to overcome the fact
that most could not or would not in practice do so. To the extent
that potential victims could not individualize their greater risk, the
cheapest cost avoidance would probably lie in the development of a
compound that did not have the danger or in a test to indicate who
was susceptible. As to both of these the drug company would clearly
be in the best position to balance the cost of developing the avoidance
devices against the cost of paying for the losses brought about by the
existing drug. To the extent users would not individualize their risk
because of a tendency to disregard warnings or contraindications ad-
dressed to the general public but could be encouraged to do so by
expert advice and prescription requirements, the prescribing physician
might be the cheapest cost avoider.
It is by no means crucial to the present argument to accept the
ultimate factual validity of any of these three analyses. What is im-
portant is to see that optimal resource allocation does not require
the same liability rule in all product-accident situations. The trans-
fusion hepatitis, cosmetic reaction and drug allergy cases alone indi-
cate that quite different liability decisions may be necessary in different
product situations. There is an inherently dangerous temptation to
generalize from one product to another, thereby oversimplifying and
erroneously assigning liability in some situations.
Not only do I disagree with Professor McKean's tendency to con-
sider products liability rules in general without analysis of specific
product-accident situations, I question his implication that in most
situations economic theory points to consumer liability plus some
fault-based manufacturer liability. Indeed, it appears to me that, to
the extent general conclusions about products liability are useful, eco-
nomic theory indicates that consumers do not in practice have a com-
parative advantage in safety.
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If consumers were held liable for most product-related accident costs
and they purchased some form of product-accident insurance it is quite
likely that the costs of knowing the accident proneness of different
consumers and of making insurance categories on that basis is such
that consumers with substantially different accident potentials would
be lumped into one category. The relatively small degree of differen-
tiation in automobile liability insurance where differentiation should
be relatively easy certainly points that way. In fact, it might not even
be economical to distinguish between product-related accidents and
those other losses, like ulcers, which are by-products of our modern
society. If the comparative advantage lay in altering patterns of con-
sumer behavior rather than in discouraging use by certain classes of
consumers, insurance might not be able to allocate the costs properly
at all. Consumer liability with insurance therefore entails a high pos-
sibility of externalization of safety incentives. If the manufacturer were
held liable, however, he would be more likely to self-insure by saving
or have commercial insurance more closely drawn to fit his particular
accident record.
If consumers were held liable and were forbidden from insuring in
order to diminish the likelihood of externalization to broader insur-
ance categories, another form of externalization would probably occur
as a result of inadequate risk awareness. Assuming that the consumer
does in fact have a comparative safety advantage, that advantage is
meaningless unless he adequately appreciates the risk he faces.
The first condition for this awareness is adequate information and
this may be very costly. Even where information is available, it may
be in the form of masses of technical data that are extremely difficult
or costly to comprehend. The two primary sources of information as
to accident potential in products liability situations are consumers
and manufacturers. Consumers as individuals are unlikely to acquire
adequate information on product dangers from personal experience
since for a given individual the likelihood of multiple incidents of
product-related accidents is small. Nor are they likely to inform other
consumers adequately because of the unorganized nature of the group.
Manufacturers, on the other hand, are not particularly inclined to
publish statistics and information concerning the accident potential
of their products, and governmental coercion to supply such informa-
tion is of questionable efficacy. The cigarette-filter-cancer controversy
is eloquent testimony of the difficulty of informing consumers.
The second condition is that consumers adequately evaluate the
risks when they are informed of the dangers. Most of us tend to under-
evaluate the likelihood of our own involvement in an accident how-
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ever compelling the statistics. Accidents happen to the other guy-I'm
careful or lucky. This attitude seems to be especially true when the
accident involves serious personal injury. The effect of such psycho-
logical underevaluation is to reduce seriously the incentives to alter
behavior. It seems likely that the manufacturer can view the situation
more objectively and more fully appreciate the risks involved.
Such externalization potentials throw considerable doubt on the
suggestion that consumer liability can lead to proper allocation, even
assuming that at first glance consumers have a comparative advantage.
Having made this argument I again emphasize that the effects of prod-
ucts liability rules cannot satisfactorily be analyzed without close ex-
amination of the particular product-accident situation involved. The
externalization factors discussed here are as subject to individual vari-
ations as the comparative safety advantages discussed earlier. Both are
guidelines for consideration not indications of the likely results of
analysis.
This caveat does not mean that each injury case should be decided
on its own bottom. Quite the contrary, the administrative costs of such
case-by-case decision making are almost certainly not worth the added
accuracy in terms of finding the cheapest cost avoider. In addition, as
I indicated in discussing the fault system in the Journal of Law and
Contemporary Problems and in The Costs of Accidents, case-by-case
determinations tend to introduce errors, because they tend to ignore
the dangers of externalization and to compare the cost avoidance po-
tentials of only the parties immediately involved. Thus, to criticize
Professor McKean for overgeneralizing does not compel case-by-case
decisions. It does suggest, however, that there is no one simple rule
that we can apply to find the cheapest cost avoider for all types of
accidents in all types of product situations. How far one should in
practice distinguish different product situations will depend on how
expensive such analysis is and how likely it is to lead to significantly
cheaper cost avoidance. 21
It will also depend on how important we believe market deterrence
of accident costs is. Throughout this critique I have followed Professor
McKean's lead and assumed a very substantial role for market deter-
rence of accident costs. As McKean well recognizes, this need not be so.
To the extent we are concerned with secondary cost avoidance, nice
21 In my book I call this choice between the costs of administering a particular system
of accident law and the effectiveness of the system "tertiary cost avoidance." The mean-
ig and interrelations between tertiary cost avoidance, secondary cost avoidance, primary
cost avoidance (which I divide into collective and market methods of control) and justice
are the principal themes of the book.
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distinctions between the comparative advantage in safety a drug man-
ufacturer may have as against the users may become insignificant. This
is not to say that we should ignore primary accident cost avoidance. It
only means that where the case in terms of primary cost avoidance is
close we will opt for the loss allocation which effectuates significant
secondary cost reductions. Thus, the existence of other goals may at
times make the decision as to who should be held liable easier.
At other times it may make matters more complex. The market is
not the only device we can use to make primary accident cost avoidance
decisions. We can also decide collectively that certain acts or activities
are to be banned regardless of their market desirability. The availabil-
ity of collective controls may at times simplify, but.may also at times
render harder, decisions as to comparative advantage in producing
safety. For instance, in the earlier example of auto manufacturer versus
driver liability we saw that driver liability made easier those choices
between paying accident costs and altering behavior of drivers. Con-
versely, we saw that manufacturer liability made easier those choices
which went to how cars are made. In the absence of collective controls
we had to choose which of the choices between accident costs and
avoidance costs we wished our liability system to highlight. Transac-
tion costs, we assumed, made it impossible to highlight both. The ex-
istence of collective controls enables us to affect relatively cheaply some
of those decisions which our choice of liability rules made too expen-
sive for the market to affect. Thus it is not surprising that we require
seat belts, given that our liability system today makes a market choice
for or against seat belts difficult. But the existence of collective controls
means that in choosing a liability rule we must not only seek to deter-
mine who has the comparative advantage in producing safety and hold
him liable, we must also decide which choices we can with greater ad-
vantage control by collective fiat and which we can best leave to the
market. If we wish to forbid driving by certain categories of accident-
prone people for moral, political or efficiency reasons, it may be that
given those prohibitions manufacturers have the comparative advan-
tage in safety, even if absent the prohibitions drivers would.
A full exposition of the complex relationship between collective and
market controls requires a discussion of book length rather than an ar-
ticle like Professor McKean's or a critique like this. And the complex-
ities of the relationship may make us despair of making intelligent
choices. But that ought not to be the conclusion either to that discus-
sion or to this paper. We are, in fact, making such choices quite unin-
telligently all the time in accident law. We are making choices without
even asking the right questions, as is indicated by the disturbing ten-
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dency in products liability cases to look simply for the best loss spreader
as if that were the only goal of accident law, and by the inclination to
resort to collective fiat to accomplish primary accident cost reduction.
I do not expect that we are ever likely to come up with empirical
data sufficient to give us complete answers to the right questions. But
that need not lead to inaction. After all, lawyers and legislators, unlike
theoretical economists, must guess all the time. And it is precisely the
function of good government to make intelligent guesses. As lawyers
and economists we must see that the right questions are asked and that
whatever data is available which helps answer the questions is sorted
out. Analyses like Professor McKean's, tentative and incomplete
though they may be, are crucial first steps toward asking the right
questions. Taken as that they are very valuable indeed.
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